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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHENANGO FORKS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2561, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-24520 
- and -
CHENANGO FORKS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JAMES R. SANDNER (ROBERT T. REILLY, of counsel), for Charging Party 
COUGHLIN & GERHART, L.L.P. (LARS P. MEAD of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Chenango Forks Central 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the Chenango Forks Teachers Association, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 2561 (Association). The improper practice charge alleges that the 
District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally announced that it would discontinue its practice of reimbursing current and 
retired employees age 65 or older, and their spouses, for the cost of Medicare Part B 
health insurance premiums (premiums). 
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In her decision, the ALJ correctly noted that employers under the Act have a duty 
to negotiate with respect to a unilateral change of a past practice with respect to 
retirement benefits for current employees in the bargaining unit. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision on the grounds that: a) the ALJ should 
have deferred to the arbitration opinion and award wherein the arbitrator found that the 
District's action did not violate a contractual provision and denied the Association's 
grievance; b) the District did not have a past practice of reimbursing the cost of the 
premiums; c) there is no contractual right to reimbursement for the cost of the premiums; 
d) the reimbursement of those premiums to retirees is not a term and condition of 
employment; e) the improper practice charge was rendered moot by the parties' 2004-
2007 collectively negotiated agreement (agreement), which covers health insurance for 
current and retired employees and contains a "supersession" clause; and (f) the 
continued payment of the reimbursements would be an unconstitutional gift of public 
funds. 
The Association's response to the District's exceptions contends that: a) the 
ALJ's decision should be affirmed because reimbursement for the premiums is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining for current employees as a form of deferred 
compensation; b) the arbitrator had not found the lack of a past practice, but rather that 
the parties had not reached an agreement to establish a binding past practice; 
c) reimbursement for the premiums is not prohibited by §201.4 of the Act and is not an 
unconstitutional gift of public funds; and d) the improper practice charge has not been 
rendered moot by the parties' subsequent agreement. 
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At the Board's request, on June 6, 2007, counsel for both parties appeared for 
oral argument regarding the exceptions and response and the question of what is the 
appropriate test under the Act for the establishment of a past practice. 
Based upon our review of the stipulated record and our consideration of the 
parties' arguments set forth herein, we are reversing and remanding the case to the ALJ 
to develop a record on the limited issues of whether, and to what extent, the Association 
and/or current employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the District's practice 
of reimbursing the cost of the premiums to retirees. 
FACTS 
As noted, the parties stipulated to the facts, which are fully set forth in the ALJ's 
decision1 and are repeated here only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
The District has reimbursed the premiums "to members or retirees 65 years of 
age or older since minimally 1980."2 While retirees have actually received the benefit 
over the years, the parties stipulated that "(t)he parties are unaware of any evidence 
that a current employee has ever received" the benefit.3 Until 1988, the duty to pay 
such reimbursements was mandated by the District's former insurance provider, the 
Empire Plan. After the District changed its insurance provider to Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
Super Blue Health Insurance Plan, the new insurance provider did not require the 
reimbursement. Nonetheless, the District continued to make the reimbursement 
payments to eligible retirees for approximately five years at a cost in excess of 
*p i u u , u w (JC I y c a i . 
1
 39 PERB H4602(2006). 
2
 Stipulation of Facts, fi19. 
3
 Stipulation of Facts, j[24. 
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On June 12, 2003, the District's Business Administrator, Kathy Blackman, sent a 
memorandum to all current employees announcing that, effective July 1, 2003, the 
District was discontinuing its practice of reimbursing the premiums to retirees 65 years 
of age or older. The memorandum stated: 
The District currently reimburses retirees 65 years of age or older for 
Medicare B premiums withheld from Social Security Administration 
checks. Effective July 1, 2003, this practice will no longer continue. The 
District is currently paying in excess of $100,000 per year and cannot 
afford this expense in addition to the significant funds spent on health 
insurance. The District will continue to pay your health insurance 
premiums to the same extent as the District will pay premiums for active 
employees. 
In addition, on or about June 24, 2003, the District sent separate letters to 
retirees informing them that "Effective July 1, 2003, we will no longer reimburse you or 
your spouse" for the premiums.4 
On September 12, 2003, the Association filed the instant improper practice 
charge alleging that the reimbursement of the premiums is a benefit that accrues to unit 
employees while they are employed, which is paid when they retire, and the District's 
announcement that it was unilaterally discontinuing the benefit was a unilateral change 
in a term and condition of employment. In addition, the Association filed a grievance 
alleging that the District's announcement violated the parties' 2001-2004 agreement, 
which provides that the District will offer health insurance coverage to employees and 
retirees. 
4
 Stipulation of Facts, 1|8, Exhibit F. Several retirees commenced an Article 78 
proceeding in New York Supreme Court challenging the District's action under a state 
law limiting the discretion of the District to diminish benefits for retirees. The Appellate 
Division, Third Department reversed the Supreme Court decision in favor of the retirees 
and remanded the matter to Supreme Court for a determination requiring additional 
facts. Bryant v Bd of Ed, 4 Misc3d 423 (2004), revd and remanded, 21 AD3d 1134 (3d 
Dept 2005). 
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On December 12, 2003, the improper practice charge was deferred by the ALJ5 
to the parties' contractual grievance procedure pursuant to the Board's decision in 
Herkimer County BOCES.6 
On November 6, 2004, the arbitrator selected to hear the grievance issued an 
opinion and award finding that the agreement was silent as to reimbursement of the 
premiums for both current employees and retirees. The arbitrator further found that the 
contract contained no maintenance of benefits clause. Although the District voluntarily 
made payments reimbursing retirees for the premiums even after its obligation to do so 
under the Empire Plan no longer existed, the arbitrator stated that such "voluntariness" 
of the District's actions did "not contain sufficient evidence of a mutual understanding 
and agreement to establish a binding past practice."7 
Thereafter, the Association moved to reopen the improper practice charge based 
on the arbitrator's determination that the parties' agreement did not cover the issue in 
dispute. On December 31, 2004, the ALJ issued her decision granting the Association's 
motion to reopen.8 
DISCUSSION 
In the District's exceptions and the Association's response, the parties focus on 
whether or not a past practice has been established under the Act, requiring the District 
to continue that practice. In support of their respective positions, the District cites to the 
5
 Chenango Forks Cent Sch Dist, 36 PERB1J4601 (2003). 
620PERBP050(1987). 
7
 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit S, p. 10. 
8
 Supra, note 1. 
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language contained in the arbitration opinion and award regarding whether a past 
practice existed, while the Association asserts that there has been a decades-long 
payment of the benefit to unit members upon retirement. 
In the arbitration opinion and award, the Association's grievance was denied on 
the grounds that the District did not have a contractual obligation to reimburse the 
premiums because the agreement lacked language requiring such payments and 
because it did not contain a maintenance of benefits clause requiring the continuation of 
extra-contractual past practices.9 
The ALJ correctly concluded that the arbitrator's statement in his opinion and 
award regarding the lack of a past practice concerning the at-issue benefit is entirely 
dicta. In doing so, the ALJ correctly found that the arbitrator's statement was neither 
convincing nor binding on PERB.10 Furthermore, to the extent that the arbitrator's 
statement regarding the standard for a past practice may have been intended to apply 
the Act's criteria for the establishment of a past practice, it was repugnant to the Act.11 
The Board's criteria for establishing a binding past practice under the Act date 
back to the decision in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (hereafter, Niagara 
Frontier).^2 However, the Board's variant statements since then regarding those criteria 
have caused some confusion. Accordingly, we hereby trace those statements and 
clarify our holdings. 
9
 Supra, note 7. 
10
 Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES, 34 PERB 1J3019 (2001). 
11
 NYCTA (Bordansky), 4 PERB 1J3031 (1971). 
12
 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
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In Niagara Frontier, a case involving an alleged past practice establishing the 
exclusivity of unit work, we asked two questions: was the at-issue work performed by 
unit employees exclusively for a sufficient period of time to have become binding and 
was the work assigned to non-unit personnel substantially similar to that exclusive unit 
work? The same test was applied in City of Rochester,™ where we found that 13 
months of such exclusivity was sufficient to establish a violation of the past practice of 
police exclusively providing traffic control at a continuously ongoing construction project. 
In County of Nassau (hereafter, County of Nassau),u we enunciated our most 
authoritative statement regarding the applicable test for the establishment of a binding 
past practice: the "practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a 
period of time sufficient under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation 
among the affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue." Citing to City of 
Rochester, we decided that, "as found by the Assistant Director, the County's...practice 
was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a period of time under the 
circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees 
that the [practice] would continue."15 In relying on the holding in City of Rochester, the 
Board recognized that the at-issue practice had continued unequivocally and 
uninterrupted for 17 months as distinguished from a practice, for example, that might 
have occurred less frequently or continuously and, therefore, would not be insulated 
13
 21 PERB1J3040 (1988), affd, City of Rochester v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB 1J7035 (4th Dept 1989). 
14
 24 PERB 1J3029, at 3058 (1991). 
15
 Id. 
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from unilateral change. In doing so, we made clear that the circumstances of each case 
need to be considered in determining when a past practice has been established. 
We here find that the clear meaning of our decision in County of Nassau is that 
the expectation of the continuation of the practice is something that may be presumed 
from its duration with consideration of the specific circumstances under which the 
practice has existed. 
The County of Nassau^6 decision has been cited consistently in subsequent 
cases as the authority for the applicable test for the establishment of a past practice. 
Nevertheless, those subsequent articulations of the test have utilized varying language 
and could be read to suggest a different meaning.17 
In light of the fact that subsequent Board decisions have utilized language at 
variance with the test in County of Nassau, while at the same time resting upon that 
case, without articulating any reason for the difference, we conclude that the Board's 
intermittent departures from the test were inadvertent. The inadvertence of the 
departures is confirmed by the Board's most recent relevant decision,18 which followed 
the test. 
16
 Supra, note 14. 
17
 Among the following cases there are inconsistencies regarding the relevance of the 
circumstances and the implications of reasonable expectations. County of Nassau, 38 
PERB 1J3030 (2005); County of Saratoga and Sheriff of Saratoga County, 37 PERB 
1J3024 (2004); City of Peekskill, 35 PERB 1J3016 (2002); State of New York (DOCS-
Groveland CorrFac), 35 PERB 1J3030 (2002); Bellmore Union Free Sch Dist, 34 PERB 
1J3009 (2001); Town of Shawangunk, 33 PERB 1J3054 (2000); County of Westchester, 
33 PERB 1J3025 (2000); State of New York (DOCS-Wende CorrFac), 33 PERB 1J3022 
(2000) and Cananstota Cent Sch Dist, 32 PERB 1J3003 (1999). 
18
 County of Nassau, supra, note 17. 
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In the alternative, based upon our judgment regarding the merits of the County of 
Nassau test, to the extent that the Board's subsequent decisions were intended to 
modify that test in general to require additional proof of mutuality of agreement and/or 
knowledge or acquiescence by a managerial or high level supervisory employee, we 
hereby overrule them. It is antithetical to the language and intent of the Act to require 
additional proof of an agreement between a public employer and an employee 
organization for PERB to find a past practice to exist. Section 205.5(d) of the Act 
expressly denies PERB jurisdiction over such agreements. Neither is any other kind of 
mutual understanding between a public employer and an employee organization 
required for a past practice to be binding. 
In the present case, the record establishes that the District had either actual or 
constructive knowledge of the past practice based on the District's reimbursement 
practice of the premiums, without restriction or qualification, the District's continuation of 
the reimbursement between 1988 and 2003 totaling approximately $500,000 and the 
June 12, 2003 memorandum that cited the cost of the practice as the rationale for 
ending it.19 This conclusion is supported, in this case, by the annual budgetary process 
mandated by Education Law, §2022. 
Moreover, even if such evidence did not exist, the extended period of the practice 
alone, under normal circumstances, would have constituted circumstantial evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie proof of the employer's knowledge, thereby imposing 
19
 See Otselic Valley Cent Sch Dist, 29 PERB 1J3005 (1996); (applying the actual or 
constructive knowledge standard to an employee organization's awareness of a change 
in a past practice). See also, Monroe BOCES #1, 28 PERB 1J3068 (1995); Sidney Cent 
Sch Dist, 28 PERB 1J3066 (1995). 
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upon the District the burden of proof of demonstrating that under the totality of the 
circumstances it did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the past practice.20 
Our conclusion regarding the District's knowledge in the present case is not 
impacted by the fact that the District's administrators and managerial staff may have 
changed over time. While it is true that under other circumstances a public employer 
may not be held responsible under the Act for every practice created by an individual 
supervisor or manager when it can demonstrate the absence of actual or constructive 
knowledge, in the present case the totality of the circumstances establishes that the 
District had actual or constructive knowledge of the practice based upon the 
expenditure of revenue to multiple retirees, with such payments being subject to 
documentation in District records, and, like all expenditures, also subject to review 
during the preparation of annual budgets. 
In her decision, the ALJ correctly concluded that the Association's charge did not 
cover persons who were affected by the District's announcement but had retired before 
the most recent agreement expired. There is no duty under the Act to bargain for those 
who are not in the bargaining unit, including retirees.21 The charge focuses on a benefit 
for current employees who retire during the life of the agreement, which will generally be 
20
 See City of Schenectady, 26 PERB fl3038 (1993) (where the Board adopted the 
totality of the circumstances standard for employer liability for an individual supervisor's 
conduct). See also Board ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 15 PERB 
1J4603, affd, 15 PERB P136 (1982); State of New York (Dept of Taxation and Finance), 
30 PERB 1J3028 (1997) (where an employer was found to have violated the Act when a 
supervisor unilaterally changed a past practice regarding a dress code established by 
his predecessor). 
21
 See, e.g., Troy Uniformed Firefighters Assn, Local 2304, IAFF, 10 PERB P015 
(1977). 
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' found to be mandatory if the underlying subject matter is mandatory. Health insurance 
benefits for current employees, or benefits related to health insurance, is a mandatory 
subject of negotiations, whether or not those employees subsequently retire during the 
period covered by the agreement.23 
It is undisputed that the District unilaterally announced to unit members that it 
was discontinuing payment of the premium to unit members and some of the employees 
might have been entitled to the benefit while employed or would become entitled to the 
benefit upon retirement. If an enforceable past practice existed regarding a mandatory 
subject of negotiations, the District would violate the Act by discontinuing that practice 
with respect to persons who were unit employees, even if the practice relates to a 
benefit to be provided upon retirement.24 
) This matter has come before the Board on a stipulated record. Although 
stipulations by the parties can be a convenient, productive and cost-saving means of 
setting forth the applicable facts for consideration, such stipulations can sometimes, 
inadvertently or purposefully, fail to include relevant facts necessary for the ALJ or the 
Board to render a final determination. 
In the present case, the stipulated record clearly demonstrates that retirees, who 
by definition are outside the bargaining unit, received reimbursement for the premiums. 
Unfortunately, the stipulation is ambiguous regarding to what extent, if any, the 
22
 See, e.g., Lynbrook Police Benevolent Assn, 10 PERB fl3067 (1977), revd in part sub 
nom., Inc Vil of Lynbrook v PERB, 64 AD2d 902, 11 PERB 1J7012 (2d Dept 1978), 
reinstated, 48 NY2d 398, 12 PERB jf7021 (1979). 
23
 Regarding health insurance, see, e.g. Town of Haverstraw v PERB, 75 AD2d 874, 13 
) PERB H7006 (2d Dept 1980); Town of Chili, 16 PERB p i 10 (1983) (premiums). 
24
 Cohoes Police Benevolent Protective Assn, 27 PERB fl3058 (1994). 
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Association and/or current employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
benefit and, therefore, had a "reasonable expectation" that the practice would be 
continued.25 Therefore, in the circumstance of this particular past practice, the Board 
remands this matter to the ALJ to take additional evidence regarding whether the 
Association and/or current employees had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
benefit and for the issuance of a decision based upon that additional evidence, if any. 
We have considered the remaining exceptions filed by the District and have 
found them to be without sufficient merit. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand the matter to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with our ruling herein. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that this matter be and it hereby is remanded to 
the ALJ. 
DATED: July 25, 2007 
Albany, New York 
jAeyivL. 
LG^itz^Cnafh Jerome Lefkcrwit eTiaifman 
f
 Robert Hife'Member 
25See County of Nassau, 38 PERB1J3004 (2005), where we found that there was no 
"reasonable expectation" that a benefit received by a nonunit employee would inure to 
the benefit of a unit employee, even when the unit employee assumed some of the 
duties performed by the nonunit employee. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PAROLE OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5441 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF PAROLE), 
Employer, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
BARTLO, HETTLER & WEISS (CHARLES J. NAUGHTON, of counsel) 
for Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JAMES D. TAYLOR of 
counsel) for Employer 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of 
counsel) for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 9, 2004, the New York State Parole Officers Benevolent Association 
(Association) filed a petition seeking to fragment approximately 1200 employees of the 
State of New York (Division of Parole) (State) in various Parole Officer titles (parole 
officers) from the Professional, Scientific and Technical Unit (PS&T) represented by the 
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Public Employees Federation (PEF) and be certified as the representative for the new 
unit.1 
In support of its petition, the Association alleged that: 1) the parole officers 
perform law enforcement duties warranting their removal from the otherwise "civilian" 
PS&T unit; 2) the parole officers have not been adequately represented by PEF; and 3) 
the parole officers share a unique community of interest. PEF opposed the petition. The 
State took no position with respect to the fragmentation of the parole officers from the 
PS&T unit, except to posit that if the parole officers were fragmented on the basis of 
their law enforcement duties, the most appropriate unit placement would be in the 
existing agency law enforcement services unit (ALES) represented by the New York 
State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Counsel 82).2 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) proceeded on the law enforcement duties 
aspect of the petition separately, reasoning that if fragmentation were granted on that 
basis alone evidence of inadequate representation and community of interest would not 
be necessary. After five days of hearing, the ALJ decided that the criminal law 
enforcement duties were not the exclusive or primary characteristic of the duties of the 
parole officers and that fragmentation was not warranted on that basis. He determined 
to proceed on the other grounds alleged by the Association. 
1
 The petition seeks the following titles: Facility Parole Officer 1, Facility Parole Officer 1 
Spanish Speaking, Facility Parole Officer Trainee 1, Facility Parolee Officer Trainee 2, 
Facility Parole Officer 2, Parole Officer, Parole Officer Spanish Language, Parole Officer 
Trainee 1, Parole Officer Trainee 1 Spanish Language, Parole Officer Trainee, Parole 
Officer Trainee 2 Spanish Language, Parole Revocation Specialist 1, Parole Revocation 
Specialist 2, Senior Parole Officer and Senior Parole Officer Special Services. Although 
part of the Parole Officer series, the proposed unit does not include Parole Revocation 
Hearing Officers. 
2
 Although put on notice of the pending petition, Council 82 declined to intervene. 
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The Association then excepted to the ALJ's interim decision on the facts and the 
law; PEF responded, asserting that the ALJ's decision was correct. In an interim 
decision issued by the Board on June 27, 2007,3 the Board treated the Association's 
exceptions as a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal, granted the motion and 
extended the State's time to respond to the motion or to notify the Board that it would 
not be filing a response. The State has neither filed a response nor advised the Board 
that it would not be doing so.4 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's interim decision on three grounds: 
A. The ALJ erroneously determined that the parole officers' "control and 
supervision" and "on-going, proactive involvement in the lives of parolees" is 
not law enforcement. 
B. The ALJ erroneously determined that the conditions of release the Division of 
Parole (Division) is charged with enforcing are not penal in nature, and thus 
erroneously determined the enforcement of the same is not criminal law 
enforcement. 
C. The ALJ misinterpreted PERB decisional precedent by too narrowly 
construing the law enforcement grounds for fragmentation. 
PEF supports the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ correctly stated the facts 
and correctly applied Board precedent to the record facts. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The ALJ's decision contains a detailed analysis of the qualifications and job 
3
 40 PERB TJ3007 (2007). 
4
 The State did not file a post-hearing brief with the ALJ and did not respond to the 
Association's motion for leave to file exceptions to the Board. 
Case No. C-5441 -4-
duties of employees in the parole officer titles,5 the facts are repeated here only as 
necessary to reach the exceptions. 
The record establishes that the Division is responsible for the promotion and 
enhancement of the public safety and protection through the development of 
supervision and treatment plans for offenders returning to the community by preparing 
an inmate for release from prison, supervising that inmate (now a parolee) on parole 
after release and, if necessary, returning that parolee to prison, should the parolee 
violate the terms of parole in an important respect.6 
To fulfill its responsibilities, the Division employs Facility Parole Officers 1 to 
prepare the documents for consideration of an inmate for parole by the Parole Board 
and to prepare the inmate for release. These officers are supervised by Facility Parole 
Officers 2. Once an inmate is released to the Division's jurisdiction, a Parole Officer is 
assigned to provide supervision. Senior Parole Officers supervise Parole Officers and 
Facility Parole Officers 2. If a parolee violates parole, the Parole Officer recommends 
that the Senior Parole Officer issue a warrant placing the parolees back into the custody 
of the Division. 
A Preliminary Hearing Officer serves as the impartial hearing officer to determine 
whether the Division had probable cause to believe that a violation of the conditions of 
release7 has occurred. If a parolee contests the findings of the Preliminary Hearing 
Officer, he or she can request a hearing before a Division Parole Revocation Hearing 
5
 40 PERB 1J4003 (2007). 
6
 See, Executive Law, §259-a, etseq. 
7
 Prior to parole, felons must execute a Certificate of Parole specifying 13 conditions of 
release that must be obeyed by the parolee, accepting parole supervision and 
acknowledging that they and their property are subject to search and inspection. See, 9 
NYCRR 8003.2. 
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Officer. The Division is represented at such a hearing by the Parole Revocation 
Specialist 1 or 2, acting as the prosecuting attorney. If the Division prevails at the 
hearing, the parolee is returned to a State correctional facility to serve the balance of his 
or her sentence. 
The qualifications for appointment as Parole Officer or Facility Parole Officer 1 
are that applicants must be 21 years of age or more, possess a four-year college 
degree and the physical, mental and moral fitness to provide a balanced approach to 
influencing human behavior and to use judgment in the enforcement of the rules and 
regulations of presumptive release, parole and conditional release.8 Civil Service 
requirements include an additional three years of experience as a "social caseworker or 
group worker in a recognized social services, correctional, criminal justice, community 
or human welfare agency."9 While a law degree or a Master's degree in social work may 
substitute for two of the three years of required experience, police officer training or 
experience will not.10 Additionally, the only other state title that is eligible for transfer into 
the parole officer series is the Department of Correctional Services Correction 
Counselor, also in the PS&T unit.11 The other titles in the parole officer series have the 
same educational requirements and additional experience requirements. 
All parole officers are designated as peace officers.12 They receive eight weeks 
of training upon their appointment, with Facility Parole Officers receiving additional 
8
 Executive Law, §259-f (2). 
JOi l l l CAIIIUIL IMO. I . 
10
 Transcript, p.132. 
11CSL, §70.1. 
12
 CPL, §2.10 (23). Parole Revocation Hearing Officers are not peace officers. 
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training on the job. Both Parole Officers and Facility Parole Officers receive peace 
officer training along with training in: basic law; social work practice and case 
management; street survival; firearms and self defense; arrest procedures; substance 
abuse relapse prevention and domestic violence prevention. Beyond annual re-
qualification in firearms and a three-hour course in use of force/deadly force required to 
maintain peace officer status, any other law enforcement-related training is voluntary. 
By comparison, titles in the ALES unit receive much more extensive training in 
law enforcement. The police officer titles in that unit, such as the Traffic and Police 
Officers and Park Police Officers, complete a 23-week residential training program. 
Environmental Conservation Officers and Investigators, also police officers, attend a 
residential training academy and receive over 13 weeks of in-service training. Forest 
Rangers, who were then peace officers, complete a 26-week training program that is 
consistent with the training and mandatory certifications necessary for law enforcement 
officers. Unlike the parole officer titles, none of these titles requires a baccalaureate 
degree, but all require much more extensive training in criminal law enforcement.13 
The ALJ's decision provides a detailed analysis of the job description for Parole 
Officers, breaking down the summary statement and each of the eleven activities that 
follow. Six of the activities and their related tasks involve public relations, community 
outreach and internal reporting requirements. The remaining activities involve 
supervision, control and rehabilitation of parolees, investigations of suspected violations 
of the conditions of parole, apprehension and re-incarceration of parolees who have 
violated their parole conditions and the administrative proceedings necessary to do so. 
These activities have the most tasks associated with them; the activity with the most 
13
 See State of New York, 33 PERB1J3042 (2000), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New 
York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 300 AD2d 929, 35 PERB lf7020 (3d Dept 2002). 
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tasks is the development and modification of an individual treatment plan for parolees. 
The Parole Officer's primary responsibility is the supervision of parolees.14 The 
record shows that there are occasions when Field Parole Officers may be involved in 
investigation, surveillance, apprehension and arrest that carry with them the same 
dangers as those involved in the investigation, surveillance, apprehension and arrest of 
an individual suspected of committing a violent crime. However, those duties do not 
constitute the primary duties of the Field Parole Officers and are not the duties of those 
Parole Officers who are assigned to correctional facilities15 or the parole revocation 
investigation or hearing process. 
Of the 1200 employees who hold a parole officer title, only approximately 22 
Field Parole Officers are assigned to the Division's Bureau of Special Service (BSS). 
Those assigned to BSS work with both federal and state law enforcement agencies to 
investigate major crimes when parolees are believed to be involved in persistent 
criminal activity or are working with the law enforcement agencies as informants. These 
voluntary special assignments involve criminal investigations, execution of search 
warrants and making criminal arrests, in which Field Parole Officers are at times used 
interchangeably with police officers assigned to the same project or task force. 
DISCUSSION 
We will discuss each of the Association's exceptions seriatim. 
The Association contends that the record does not support the ALJ's conclusions as 
to what constituted police officer qualifications and duties. We disagree. The ALJ's 
decision sets forth over 25 pages of facts, outlining in detail the qualifications and duties 
14
 Transcript, p. 45. 
15
 Transcript, pp. 135-36. 
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of each of the parole officer titles and correctly applied Board precedent to those facts. 
A majority of the testimony at the hearing about the performance of law 
enforcement duties by parole officers dealt with the Field Parole Officers assigned to 
BSS, whose duties are specialized and "not typical of the class."16 The record shows 
that most employees in the parole officer titles have little involvement in traditional law 
enforcement duties. Indeed, the Division does not require a parole officer to make an 
arrest even if he sees a crime being committed by a parolee.17 A parole officer may 
make the arrest as a peace officer, but may also call upon a police officer for 
assistance.18 The jurisdiction of parole officers lies in the enforcement of the parolee's 
conditions of release, not criminal law. Therefore, the ALJ was correct in stating that 
parolees who violate the conditions of release are subject to the supervision and control 
of parole officers, whether or not the violation also constitutes a violation of criminal law. 
The Association also contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that enforcement 
of a parolee's conditions of release does not constitute general law enforcement. 
While Penal Law, §§70.40 and 70.45 set forth the statutory framework for parole, 
conditional release and post-release supervision, it is the Executive Law that 
establishes the Division and governs the conditions under which parole is granted and 
revoked.19 As pointed out by the ALJ, only one of the thirteen conditions of release 
enforced by Parole Officers deal with activity that is criminal in nature and violation of 
any one of the conditions may result in the revocation of parole and re-incarceration. 
O O I I I I t X i i i D u NO. a. 
17
 Transcript, pp. 740-41. 
18
 Transcript, p. 329. 
19
 Executive Law, Art. 12-B. 
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The bulk of the Association's arguments in this exception relate to the activities of 
those Field Parole Officers assigned to task forces and special operations. As noted 
earlier, only approximately 22 out of 1200 Parole Officers work side-by-side with federal 
and state law enforcement officers performing law enforcement duties 
Finally, the Association argues that the ALJ misinterpreted and narrowly 
construed PERB decisions regarding the general law enforcement basis for 
fragmentation. 
We have long dealt with the issues associated with the most appropriate unit for 
public employees in police officer titles or who primarily or exclusively perform general 
criminal law enforcement activities associated with police officers. 
In State of New York,20 reaffirming our initial unit decision establishing the 
Security Services Unit, the Board rejected an effort to have all State police officers, 
other than those employed by the State Police, placed in a separate and distinct unit. 
Our decision in that case is reflective of the long-standing principle under §207.1 of the 
Act that the most appropriate bargaining unit is generally the largest unit because larger 
units are more likely to provide effective and meaningful negotiations.21 An equally 
important longstanding principle is that fragmentation of existing units will not be 
granted without proof of compelling evidence, such as a conflict of interest or 
inadequate representation. 22 
In a series of decisions that followed State of New York, supra, the Board 
205PERBfl3022(1972) 
21
 State of New York, 2 PERB ^3035-3038, 3044 (1968). See also County of 
Schenectady, 25 PERB P043 (1992); County of Ulster, 22 PERB fl3030 (1989). 
22
 Deer Park UFSD, 22 PERB 1J3014 (1989); State of New York, 21 PERB 1J3050 
(1988); Chautauqua County BOCES, 15 PERB 1J3126 (1982). 
Case No. C-5441 -1 re-
determined that distinct bargaining units were most appropriate for employees holding 
police officer titles in police departments. Subsequently, the Board found that separate 
bargaining units were appropriate for certain other employees holding titles that are 
statutorily granted police powers and whose duties are predominately the enforcement 
of New York's general criminal laws. 
In City of Amsterdam,22, the Board articulated an explicit rationale for fragmenting 
police officers, recognizing that police officers were fundamentally different from all 
other public employees because "the police service is concerned with the broad 
spectrum of human rights, public order and the protection of life and property."24 Based 
on their unique legal authority and responsibilities, the Board concluded that the most 
appropriate unit for police officers was a unit consisting only of police officer titles 
excluding all other employees, including those who perform other public safety 
functions. 
The rationale underlying the creation of distinct units for police officers was 
elaborated on in Village of Skaneateles25: "1) the special and unique police community 
of interest deriving from their law enforcement duties and the hazards attendant thereto; 
2) the compatibility of such separate unit with the joint responsibilities of the public 
employer and public employees to serve the public, the primary commitment of law 
enforcement being part and parcel of the employer's fundamental mission to preserve 
public order; and 3) the separate impasse resolution procedures under §209.4 of the 
Act which can create pitfalls to stable labor relations for a combined police and non-
2310 PERB 1J3031 (1977). 
24
 Id. at 3061. 
25
 16 PERB 1J3070 (1983). 
Case No. C-5441 -11-
police unit."26 
In County of Dutchess and Dutchess County Sheriff,27 the Board reconsidered its 
prior fragmentation decisions regarding sheriffs department personnel,28 finding that the 
"law enforcement" responsibilities and duties of Deputy Sheriffs and other sheriffs 
department employees may be sufficient to warrant the establishment of a separate unit 
of Deputy Sheriffs. The Board acknowledged that the typical duties of Deputy Sheriffs, 
which may include patrolling in a police vehicle or on foot, investigating suspicious 
activities, making arrests, maintaining order in crowds and public gatherings, and 
answering questions for the public, may fairly be considered to be police work. The 
Board found that the law enforcement duties of Deputy Sheriffs could justify a separate 
bargaining unit for them based upon an arguable unique community of interest and/or 
actual or potential conflict of interest with other employees in the Sheriffs Department 
who may not have any similar assigned duties and remanded the matter for the taking 
of further evidence as to the actual duties of the Deputy Sheriffs.29 
Thereafter, in County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County,30 the Board was 
presented with a case seeking the fragmentation of Deputy Sheriffs-Criminal from a unit 
which included Deputy Sheriffs-Officers based on the general law enforcement duties 
26
 County of Warren, 21 PERB P080, at 3082 (1988). 
27
 26 PERB H3069 (1993). 
28
 See County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 25 PERB 1J3062 (1992); County of Erie 
and Erie County Sheriff, 22 PERB 1J3055 (1989); County of Warren, supra, note 26; 
County of Albany and Albany County Sheriff, 19 PERB fi3054 (1986); County of Albany 
and Albany County Sheriff, 15 PERB 1J3008 (1982); County of Schenectady and Sheriff 
of Schenectady County, 14 PERB 1J3013 (1981). 
29
 The case was settled after the remand. 
30
 29 PERB P031 (1996). 
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assigned to the Deputy-Sheriffs-Criminal. In rendering its determination, the Board 
recognized that police officer status under CPL §1.20(34) is one factor to be considered 
in uniting determinations. In addition, the Board applied the definition of police officer 
contained in CSL §58(3) and found that employees with police powers, whose exclusive 
or primary duties were "the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of 
the general criminal laws of the state," were entitled to a fragmented unit. Concluding 
that the Deputy Sheriffs-Criminal had the qualifications, training and duties that are 
unique to police officers responsible for the prevention and detection of crime under the 
general criminal laws of the state and that such law enforcement duties were their 
exclusive or primary job responsibilities, the Board granted the fragmentation petition as 
to those employees. 
Four years later in County of Rockland,31 the Board applied the rationale from 
County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, supra, to fragment Investigative Aides in a 
District Attorney's office from a unit of civilian employees, based upon the fact that the 
aides were assigned exclusively to perform criminal law enforcement duties, much of 
which were undercover, including infiltrating and investigating narcotics networks and 
other crime networks; conducting surveillances; providing backup and security for other 
undercover officers, using deadly force to do so if necessary; participating with other 
police agencies in raids; making arrests; and maintaining custody and control of 
evidence. Finding that the Investigative Aides' training and "predominant" duties in 
criminal law enforcement established for them a community of interest separate and 
apart from other employees in the unit, the Board held that the fragmentation sought 
was warranted because the Investigative Aides were regularly exposed to criminal law 
31
 32 PERB 1J3074 (1999), confirmed, 34 PERB 1J7013 (Sup Ct Albany County 2001), 
affirmed 295 AD2d 790, 35 PERB TJ7013 (3d Dept 2002). 
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enforcement by virtue of their training and duties. However, in reaching its decision in 
that case, the Board declined to decide whether the Investigative Aides were granted 
the statutory authority to engage in police officer duties and focused solely on their 
training and job responsibilities to conclude that fragmentation was appropriate. 
Applying the same standard in State of New York,32 the Board fragmented the 
Forest Ranger position, along with certain other titles with police officer powers, from 
the Security Services Unit, although Forest Rangers were peace officers. After 
reviewing the qualifications, training and duties of the Forest Rangers, the Board found 
that they performed a full-range of criminal law enforcement duties for approximately 
50% of their time and were involved in search and rescue missions during which they 
directed responding personnel, including State police and deputy sheriffs, for 
approximately 20% of their duties. Although Forest Rangers had not been granted 
police officer powers under Criminal Procedure Law §1.20(34), the Board concluded 
that their duties were sufficient to support fragmentation: they provided ancillary 
services which are directly and predominantly related to criminal law enforcement. 
Since that decision, the Legislature has amended the Criminal Procedure Law to 
expressly grant Forest Rangers police officer status. 
Therefore, Board precedent firmly establishes that fragmentation is appropriate 
for public employees who are police officers or hold a title that has also been granted 
police officer status by the Legislature and whose exclusive or predominant duties are 
32
 33 PERB TJ3042 (2000), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel 
Bd, 300 AD2d 929, 35 PERB 1J7020 (3d Dept 2002). 
CPL§1.20(34)(v). 
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the enforcement of the State's general criminal laws.34 To the extent that County of 
Rockland and State of New York35 suggest otherwise, we decline to follow them. 
Rather, we rely upon the long-standing principles for fragmentation set forth in State of 
New York,36 Village of Skaneateles37 and Deer Park Union Free School District38 
There are a multitude of titles assigned to perform important law enforcement 
related duties involving public safety. However, whether a position has been granted 
police officer status under CPL §1.20(34) remains the initial factor to be considered in 
determining whether fragmentation is appropriate based on the performance of those 
duties. The Legislature, in drafting the Criminal Procedure Law, has established a clear 
dichotomy between the respective scope of law enforcement authority of police officers 
and peace officers confirming the unique authority and responsibilities of individuals 
with police officer status.39 
None of our prior uniting decisions dealing with various law enforcement titles 
supports the fragmentation sought by the Association.40 Notwithstanding the important 
public safety functions performed by parole officers, as well as the dangers they face in 
34
 We do not reach the issue of whether a separate impasse resolution procedure 
under §209.4 of the Act alone warrants fragmentation. See State of New York, 39 
PERB P032 (2006). 
35
 Supra, note 32. 
36
 Supra, note 20. 
37
 Supra, note 25. 
38
 Supra, note 22. 
39
 See, CPL §2.20. 
40
 Neither do the other cases cited by the Association in its brief support fragmentation. 
They are either not controlling or not relevant to our inquiry into the duties actually 
performed by the Division's parole officer titles. 
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dealing almost exclusively with a population of convicted felons, the Legislature has not 
granted them police officer status. In addition, the evidence in the record establishes 
that the parole officer titles do not perform criminal law enforcement duties as their 
exclusive or predominant responsibility, even those parole officers who are assigned to 
special services or operations. Indeed, some of the parole officer titles have virtually no 
criminal law enforcement duties. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. Therefore, the matter is remanded to the ALJ for further processing 
consistent with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 25, 2007 
Albany, New York 
v JAIPMS 
7 Jerome l/efkowitz, Chairman 
c 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-26964 
- and -
VILLAGE OF MONROE, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
RICHARD A. GLICKEL, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Monroe Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA), to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
that conditionally dismissed the PBA's improper practice charge which alleged that the 
Village of Monroe (Village) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it directed an employee in the PBA bargaining unit to 
execute a medical confidentiality waiver form, different from the form agreed upon in the 
parties' collectively negotiated agreement, as a condition to his continued receipt of 
benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c. 
The ALJ deferred the improper practice charge to the parties' contractual 
grievance procedure because the PBA had filed a grievance alleging that the Village's 
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use of the new form violated the collectively negotiated agreement and the alleged 
§209-a.1(a) violation was unsupported by the facts. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by deferring 
the improper practice charge when PERB has exclusive, non-delegable jurisdiction to 
hear a charge alleging contract repudiation and that the Village asserted no colorable 
defense to the alleged contract repudiation. The PBA further argues that the ALJ 
incorrectly dismissed the alleged §209-a.1(a) violation. The Village supports the ALJ's 
decision. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and remand the case to the ALJ for 
further processing consistent with our decision, infra. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only 
as necessary to decide the exceptions.1 
The PBA and the Village are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement that 
contains a negotiated GML §207-c procedure, including a negotiated medical 
confidentiality waiver form. Section 14.3 of the procedure also states: "The parties agree 
that any disputes relating to the administration of the provisions of this procedure shall 
be resolved through the hearing procedure contained in Section 11 herein and all other 
disputes shall be processed through Article 17-Grievance Procedure." 
The gravamen of the charge is that the Village implemented the use of a medical 
confidentiality waiver form, entitled "HIPAA Compliant Waiver for the Administration of 
1
 40 PERB 114512(2007). 
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Benefits Under General Municipal Law 207-c," that is different from the negotiated GML 
§207-c confidentiality wavier form. The charge also alleges that, on June 28, 2006, a 
bargaining unit member was sent a memorandum requiring him to execute and return 
the new confidentiality waiver form as a condition of being allowed to return from GML 
§207-c leave or face losing his GML §207-c benefits. 
In its answer, the Village asserted that it had already addressed the PBA's 
concerns regarding the new confidentiality waiver form. The Village stated that the use 
of the new form was required by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA)2 relating to the required content of a valid medical information release 
authorization form before a health care provider releases confidential medical 
information. Further, the Village alleges that it created the new form based on a 
standard form developed by the New York State Office of Court Administration for the 
release of health information during litigation. 
The PBA thereafter filed a grievance, which, at the time of the pre-hearing 
conference in this matter, was scheduled for arbitration. The ALJ, having been made 
aware of the filing of the grievance, requested that the parties brief the issue of deferral 
of the improper practice charge to the parties' contractual grievance procedure. 
DISCUSSION 
The PBA argues in its improper practice charge that the Village's actions in 
substituting a release form different from the contractually agreed upon form constitutes 
a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of negotiations in violation of §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act. The PBA further argues in its charge that the Village threatened the officer with 
2
 Pub L No 104 -191, 110 Stat 1936 (1996) (codified primarily in Titles 18, 26 and 42 of 
the United States Code). 
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losing his GML §207-c benefits if he continued to assert his rights to use the 
contractually agreed-upon form in violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act. 
In its brief and in its exceptions, the PBA contends that the ALJ erred in 
conditionally dismissing the charge under Herkimer County BOCES,3 on the grounds 
that the Village's use of a different medical confidentiality waiver form constitutes a 
repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement because the Village has acted 
without a colorable contractual claim of right. 
Contrary to the PBA's argument, our decisions determining whether a repudiation 
of the parties' collective bargaining agreement has occurred have not required a 
colorable claim of contract right, but only that the respondent has raised an arguable 
defense to the allegation that it has disavowed a collectively negotiated agreement or a 
specific provision thereof.4 Although certain Board decisions have pointed to a 
respondent's "claim of contractual privilege" in defense of a repudiation claim5 that does 
not mean that a "colorable" defense to a repudiation charge may rest only on a 
contractual claim of right.6 In Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
3
 20 PERB H3050(1987). 
4
 Jefferson County Board of Supervisors, 6 PERB 1J3031 (1973), revd on other grounds, 
Jefferson County Board of Supervisors v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 44 AD2d 
893, 7 PERB ^[7009 (4th Dept 1974), affd 36 NY2d 534, 8 PERB fl7008 (1985). 
5
 See Honeoye Cent Sch Dist, 18 PERB 1J3085 (1985); Connetquot Cent Sch Dist, 21 
PERB H3049 (1988); Monticello Cent Sch Dist, 22 PERB 1J3002 (1989); NYCTA, 35 
PERB H3008 (2002). 
6
 See Comsewogue Union Free Sch Dist, 27 PERB 1J3047 (1994); Board ofEduc of the 
City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, 25 PERB P064 (1992); State of New York (SUNY-
College at Potsdam), 22 PERB 1J3045 (1989). 
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Buffalo7, the Board stated: 
In several decisions, we have distinguished a contract repudiation, which 
is cognizable as an improper practice, from a contract breach or a contract 
enforcement, which is not. In making that distinction, we have emphasized 
that a meritorious repudiation claim arises only in "extraordinary 
circumstances" in which a party to the contract denies the existence of an 
agreement or acts in total disregard of the contract's terms without any 
colorable claim of right, [citations omitted.] 
In the alternative, the PBA challenges the ALJ's finding that the Village's 
asserted legal claim under HIPAA in support of its use of a different medical 
confidentiality waiver form constitutes a colorable claim of right in defense of its 
conduct. The PBA argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that the Village had a 
colorable legal claim without examining the merits of the Village's legal claim. We 
agree. 
The Village does not deny that the collectively negotiated agreement exists or 
that it has no obligation under the contractually negotiated GML §207-c procedure to 
use the agreed-upon form. Instead, it argues that HIPAA requires it to have bargaining 
unit members execute a medical confidentiality waiver form containing supplemental 
language and that the supplemental language is cosmetic in nature. 
Upon our review of the applicable HIPAA regulations, we conclude that HIPAA 
does not constitute a colorable claim of right for the Village's unilateral action. In 
response to the exceptions, the Village has not articulated a persuasive legal argument 
demonstrating that its actions were mandated by HIPAA. 
Pursuant to the standards promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services, a "covered entity" may not use or disclose protected health 
; Supra, note 7, at 3135. 
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information without a valid authorization as defined by the HIPAA regulations.8 Under 
HIPAA and its regulations, the definition of a "covered entity" does not include 
employers but does include a health care provider.9 Therefore, although a physician 
may face possible sanctions for disclosing medical information without a valid 
authorization under the standards mandated by HIPAA, the Village would not face 
similar sanctions by continuing to abide by the negotiated form. 
The Village, in response to the PBA's exceptions, acknowledges the limited 
regulatory scope of HIPAA. Nevertheless, it attempts to justify its unilateral action on the 
claim that a physician may refuse to release health care information to the Village 
without a valid HIPAA authorization form, thereby infringing on its right to investigate an 
employee's claim under GML §207-c. Such speculation does not constitute a defense to 
a repudiation charge.10 Even if the Village were a "covered entity", HIPAA does not 
^ require that an authorization form be as broad in scope as the Village's new form.11 
Based on the Village's lack of a colorable contractual or legal claim of right, we 
conclude that the ALJ erred in finding that the Village did not repudiate the collectively 
negotiated agreement.12 Therefore, we reverse the ALJ's decision to conditionally 
dismiss the §209-a.1(d) allegation pursuant to the policies articulated in Herkimer 
County BOCES and remand it to the ALJ for further processing consistent with our 
845CFR§164.508(a). 
9
 42 USC §§ 1320d-1(a), 1320d(3), 45 CFR §160.103. 
10
 Monticello Cent Sch Dist, 22 PERB P002 (1989). 
11
 45 CFR §164.508(c). 
12
 Supra, note 3. 
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decision herein.13 
On remand, in determining the merits of the charge, the broader questions of 
whether the new medical release form is negotiable under GML §207-c14and to what 
extent HIPAA's regulations preempt the negotiability of medical confidentiality waiver 
forms subject to HIPAA15 should be examined. 
Finally, the PBA argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing the alleged violation of 
§209-a. 1 (a) of the Act. The PBA argues that the purported threat to the police officer of 
the loss of GML §207-c benefits if he persisted in using the contractual medical 
confidentiality waiver form was interference in the employee's concerted and protected 
exercise of contractual rights. 
The PBA cites to our decision in City of Albany™ as support for its assertion that if 
employee exercises a contract right and is threatened by his or her employer and the 
employer does not have a colorable claim of right under the same contract, the employer 
must be found to have violated §209-a.1 (a) of the Act. Our decision in that case held: 
Although we have suggested that an employer may violate the Act if it 
interferes with or discriminates against an employee for the 
employee's exercise of a contract right, [footnote omitted] we believe that 
such a violation requires minimally that the employee's contract right be 
clear and that the employer's interference or discrimination be taken 
without a colorable claim of corresponding right. For example, an 
employer arguably violates the Act if it threatens an employee with 
13
 Supra, note 3. 
14
 See, Schenectady PBA vPERB, 85 NY2d 480, 487 (1995). 
15
 See, Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch Dist, 20 PERBH3041 (1997) (holding that 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 USC §1681, and related federal 
regulations did not preempt the negotiability of certain aspects of an employer's sexual 
harassment policy.) 
16
 25 PERB 513026 (1992). 
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discipline for filing a grievance if the contractual procedure plainly permits 
the employee to file the grievance. 
The PBA argues that because the Village here does not assert a colorable 
contractual claim of right, it can be found to have violated §209-a.1(a) when it cautioned 
the officer that his GML §207-c benefits would be in jeopardy if he did not execute the 
amended medical confidentiality waiver form. Based on our conclusion that the Village 
did not have a colorable claim of right under the HIPAA to require the new waiver form, 
it cannot defend against the §209-a.1 (a) charge by relying on the HIPAA requirement 
that individuals be informed of the consequences for refusing to sign a valid 
authorization form.17 For the same reasons we have sustained the PBA's repudiation 
argument, we reverse the ALJ's decision to dismiss the PBA's §209-a.1 (a) claim and 
remand it for further processing consistent with our decision. 
Based on the foregoing, we sustain the PBA's exceptions, reverse the ALJ and 
remand the case to the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is reinstated and the 
case is remanded for further processing. 
DATED: July 25, 2007 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
17
 45 CFR 164.508(c)(2)(ii)(B) requires that an authorization set forth "(t)he 
consequences to the individual of a refusal to sign the authorization when, in 
accordance with paragraph (b)(4) of this section, the covered entity can condition 
treatment, enrollment in the health plan, or eligibility for benefits on failure to obtain such 
authorization." 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5693 
TOWN OF WINDHAM, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5693 -: 
Included: All full-time and part-time Police Officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 25, 2007 
Albany, New York 
(/g03ftO 
/Jerome LefkowitzvChairm 
Is 
7jy{,s,Jsf Act^ 
'"Robert S' Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5699 
TOWN OF CAIRO, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
Certification - C-5699 - 2 -
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All Police Officers employed by the Town of Cairo. 
Excluded: Police Chief and all other Town employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 25, 2007 
Albany, New York 
^ L y^t£ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ARKPORT STAFF UNITED, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5700 
ARKPORT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding1 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Arkport Staff United has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
1
 The petition as filed sought inclusion of the title Registered Professional Nurse 
(School Nurse). The Arkport Faculty Association intervened in this proceeding for the 
sole purpose of seeking placement of that title in its unit. The Petitioner and Intervenor 
have agreed that the most appropriate placement of the title is in the Intervener's unit. 
The District has refused to consent to that placement, therefore, the Intervenor has 
been advised that the proper avenue for placement of the Registered Professional 
Nurse in its unit would be the filing of a unit placement petition. As a result of the 
Petitioner's agreement to withdraw its request for the title, the Intervenor has withdrawn 
its interest in this petition. 
Certification - C-5700 page 2 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All full time and part time employees in the titles of: Teacher Aide 
(including Special Education Aide, Library Aide, Instructional Aide), 
Maintenance Mechanic, Head Building Maintenance Mechanic, 
Groundskeeper, Student Services Secretary, Account Clerk/Payroll 
Attendance Coordinator, Cleaner, Custodian, and all other 
secretarial, buildings, grounds and maintenance titles, and 
computer support titles employed by the Arkport Central Schools. 
Excluded: Secretary to the Superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Arkport Staff United. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: July 25,2007 * H* I ^ ^ 
Albany, New York / / / J J <?fo 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chjatfrp'an 
/ 
